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The area of law denominated "products liability" includes at least
three distinctly different theoretical bases for possible liability for personal
injuries or property damage: negligence; breach of warranty under the
Uniform Commercial Code; and strict tort liability. Damages collectible
could be the same under any of the theories, and in certain circumstances
all three theories could be pleaded in the alternative. However, developments
in the courts during the past seven years indicate that the trend in Missouri,
as elsewhere, is toward an overshadowing of the first two theories by the
broad strict liability sounding in tort. At some time in the rather near
future the phrase "products liability" might connote strict tort liability
shaped by many of the concepts previously developed in both negligence
cases and contractual warranty cases. This article seeks to differentiate the
theories and to explore the requirements and defenses in a cause of action
based on the strict liability theory in Missouri.
PART I: THEORIES
Since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.1 and its acceptance in Missouri,
negligence is an available theory for an injured plaintiff against either the
immediate supplier of the product which injured him or anyone in the
distribution chain back to and including the manufacturer of the entire
product or any of its components. The limitation that a duty of due care
existed in the absence of privity of contract only when the product was
inherently dangerous began its demise with MacPherson, and over the years
has been eliminated in Missouri also.2 The obvious shortcoming of the
*This is Part I of a two part article. The second part will appear in a later
issue.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964); LaPlant v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961); McCormick
v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 612, 144 S.W.2d 866 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1940). Although the court in the first case says it would come within the
exception, it does not indicate that this is a requirement for liability as the De-
fense Research Institute would have one believe. Monograph, Brief Opposing
Strict Liability in Tort, p. 9.
(459)
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negligence theory is the difficulty of proving lack of ordinary care. Negligence
existing at the manufacturing level may be impossible to establish even
with the aid of res ipsa lQquitur. Intermediate suppliers such as wholesalers
and retailers certainly are not expected to tear apart each product they
sell and subject it to rigid inspections, so a supplier could use due care and
yet pass on a dangerous product.3 The heart of negligence is reasonable care
on the part of the defendant, not absolute or extreme care. Furthermore, if
the danger of the product was discoverable by the use of due care, plaintiff
races the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. It would be a
complete defense even if plaintiff was merely negligently unaware or inad-
vertent to the risk of harm.
Pleading an action sounding in contract obviates the necessity of
proving a "fault" element in the sense of lack of care in a negligence action.
Since the adoption of the U.C.C. in Missouri, there is no doubt as to the
applicability of implied or express warranty theories. 4 Section 400.2-314
describes the implied warranty of merchantibility which includes that the
goods "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,"
and section 400.2-315 describes the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose where the buyer relies upon the skill and judgment of the
seller who has reason to know the particular purpose for which the goods
are required. Section 400.2-313 describes express warranty as being created
upon any affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer. It is section
400.2-314 that overrules State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Slhain5 in which the
Supreme Court held there was no implied warranty by a retailer that a
blouse was fit for the ordinary purpose of wearing it. The code supercedes
Jones at least as far as an action predicated upon the law of sales, and
therefore contractual in nature, is concerned. A pleading sounding in con-
tract and setting out implied warranties can support a claim for the
consequential damages of personal injury or property damages since section
400.2-715 specifically provides for it.6 However, such an action would be
subject to all the requirements and limitations of the law of sales as
embodied in the U.C.C. Most important may be section 400.2-318 which
describes the persons who may claim the benefit of such implied warranties.
3. Willey v. Fyrogas Corp., 363 Mo. 406, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952); Winkler
v. Macon Gas Co., 361 Mo. 1017, 238 S.W.2d 386 (1951); Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of
Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944); Schroder v. Barron Dady
Motor Co., 111 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1937).
4. Sections 400.2-313 through 400.2-318, RSMo 1963 Supp.
5. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944).
6. Section 400.2-715, RSMo 1963 Supp.; Jones, Remedies under Article 2,
30 Mo.L.REv. 212, 216 (1965).
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One must remember that the law of sales deals primarily with transactions
between persons who are in privity of contract, i.e., who dealt with one
another in a bargaining situation. Section 400.2-318 goes quite far in ex-
tending the benefits of a seller's implied warranty not only to his immediate
buyer but also to members of the buyer's family and to guests in his home.
It does nothing to extend the warranties of a manufacturer to purchasers
from a wholesaler or to purchasers from a retailer. The party most often
injured by a product is the purchaser from a retailer or a subsequent user,
and to these people the manufacturer's warranty is not extended. Even the
retailer's implied warranty would not extend to an employee of his buyer
or to a neighbor of his buyer or to a bystander on the street injured while
the buyer uses the product. In short, the crucial limitation to an action
based upon the implied warranties of the law of sales under the U.C.C. is
that a form of privity of contract is required between the injured party and
the defendant.
Other limitations of an action sounding in contract that could be im-
portant are the requirement for giving notice of breach within a reasonable
time" and the provisions for disclaimer of warranty.8
In Missouri an unusual situation exists in regard to the statute of
limitations. The U.C.C. provides its own period of limitations for warranty
actions; it is only four years from the time of breach.9 The ordinary tort
statute of limitations is five years.10 If the limitations or requirements of
the law of sales create no doubts as to the ability to sustain a cause of action
sounding in contract, plaintiff's attorney need not trouble his head as to
whether he pleads a contract or tort theory to recover for consequential
damages. When there are doubts he should attempt to draft, as his sole
theory or in the alternative, a pleading which states the elements for strict
tort liability without using traditional contract language."
The recent nationwide products liability explosion has centered around
the imposition of strict tort liability for personal injuries and property
damage. Quite often the courts imposing this liability utilized the device
7. Section 400.2-607(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
8. Section 400.2-316, RSMo 1963 Supp.
9. Section 400.2-725, RSMo 1963 Supp.
10. Section 516.120, RSMo 1959.
11. All three authors of articles on products liability cases in the April 1967
MissouRI BAR JOURNAL were bothered by the possible application of U.C.C. re-
quirements to an action for personal injuries. Godfrey, A Glimpse at Products
Liability, 156; Kodas, Products Liability, Plaintiff's Approac. to Proof, 159;
Lowther, Defense of Products Liability Case, 166. Hopefully, the instant article
will make clear that the U.C.C. is inappropriate so long as the action can be
characterized as a tort action.
1967]
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of "implied warranty without privity." An understanding of why this was
done and what it means clears the way for understanding the present and
future of products liability law both in Missouri and elsewhere. By the
twentieth century the theory now embodied in the U.C.C. that permitted
recovery for physical harm in a contract action against one with whom the
plaintiff had been in privity was well accepted. Therefore, questions of tort
liability were raised only when the parties had not been in privity.
The ultimate manufacturer was ordinarily the one best able to satisfy
a judgment, but without privity between the injured party and the manu-
facturer supporting an action sounding in contract was impossible. Plaintiff's
attorneys sought to convince courts that a strict liability as imposed in the
contractual actions could be justified against the remote manufacturers. This
would relieve them of proving lack of care; but in the absence of privity,
it had to be a liability in the nature of tort, not contract. This was ac-
complished with relative ease during the 1920's and 1930's in cases involving
food products prepared and packaged by the processor with the ex-
pectation that they not be opened or inspected until they were ultimately
consumed. A combination of factors justified strict liability: the extreme
danger from consumption of unwholesome food, the ultimate consumer's
inability to safeguard himself from the dangers of contaminated food, and
the extreme difficulty of proving negligence against remote processors of
food products. Courts also articulated as a policy reason for strict liability
that holding the manufacturer at his peril would force him to do all possible
to safeguard the products he supplied. To sum it up, "social justice" de-
manded strict liability.12
But these were basic policy reasons supporting what might appear to
be a wholly new judge-made principle of law. The certainty and continuity
of our remarkable common law system is assured by courts' resistence to
"making new law." A connecting link between pre-existing legal principles
and an otherwise new legal concept cuts under the resistence and assures
continuity. Plaintiffs' attorneys supplied the link with "implied warranty" 3
and forged it with modern marketing practices. Historically, implied war-
ranties had sounded in tort and may have originated in the law's effort to
force strict liability for harm from unwholesome food. The legal concept of
12. Madouras v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1936); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
13. Prosser says that warranty was first used in 1927 and that subsequent
cases until 1962 all adopted some theory of warranty. Prosser, The Assault upon
tle Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1106 (1960); PROSSER AND SMITh, ToRTs CASES
AND IMATERIALS, p. 818, 4th ed., Foundation Press (1967).
[Vol. 32
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warranty of fitness for consumption had been recognized before the action
of assumpsit developed. In fact, implied warranty had not been included
in an action sounding in contract until 1778. In other words, warranty was
a tort concept. It was an obligation recognized by law for the redress of
harm without regard to actual or implied in fact intention or consent of
any persons. Warranty apparently first became connected with contract
principles for convenience in pleading. Its application was later limited to
contract situations in order to protect growing industry and commerce from
heavy liabilities."4 Thus, requiring privity for warranty liability achieved
the same underlying purpose that the privity requirements for negligence
liability of Winterbottom v. Wright'5 had served. When twentieth century
"social justice" demanded strict liability in the food cases, plaintiffs' at-
torneys argued that the artificial contract limitations could be swept away
and the original tort sense of "implied warranty" could be reinstated. The
result would be strict tort liability described as liability in the absence of
privity for breach of an implied warranty. With social policy and historical
legal principles supporting them, plaintiff's attorneys buttressed their argu-
ments with shrewd analyses of modem marketing practices indicating that
the remote manufacturer should be held liable as a warrantor because he,
in fact, guaranteed the good quality of his food to the ultimate consumer.
The courts were convinced that this was done not only through mass ad-
vertising designed to reach the ultimate consumer but also through the very
act of placing the goods on the market with the intent that they be con-
sumed without further significant inspection. This act of putting the food
into the channels of trade constituted a representation that the food was
fit for consumption, and the consumer's act of using the food constituted his
reliance upon the representation. Social policy, historical principle, and
actual fact marshalled together were invincible. Thus was kindled the
products liability revolution that exploded in the 1960's. It was not until
1962 that a court imposed strict liability without using the device of "im-
plied warranty." Since that time parallel lines of decision have developed
in the various states: some courts still utilize the implied warranty theory
as a tool or means for applying strict liability while others impose strict
liability without the use of this artificial device.
16
14. In Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 532, 536 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1952) the history of warranty is given. See also, Roberts, Implied War-
ranties-Tie Privity Ride and Strict Liability-The No-n-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L.
REv. 194 (1962).
15. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
16. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rzv. 791 (1966).
1967]
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It is to the credit of Missouri attorneys and courts that from the first
food cases Missouri opinions articulated in some fashion a recognition that
a tort liability was being imposed in spite of the use of "warranty" termi-
nology. Missouri courts have helped to shape and foster the nationwide
revolution by handing down some of the nation's leading cases in products
liability development. An often cited case is Madouras v. Kansas City
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.17 in which the Kansas City Court of Appeals af-
firmed a judgment against the bottler and in favor of the plaintiff who
had purchased a bottle of contaminated Coke from a retailer. As a make-
weight argument the court suggested that if privity was required right
thinking persons would find it here, but the decision's significance is that
it upholds a tort liability, not a contract liability. The petition alleged
the facts of drinking the Coke and the resulting illness in great detail.
Near the conclusion of the petition it alleged that the defendant by sell-
ing the beverage knowing that it would be consumed by the public "thereby
warranted and represented said beverage as being a pure, harmless, whole-
some, safe drink for all persons who might purchase the same." No allega-
tions sought to establish a contract between defendant and plaintiff. Even
the one use of the word "warranted" did not suggest a warranty to this
plaintiff individually. The court quoted from a Tennessee case as follows:
"There are many authorities holding an implied warranty to exist, as
between seller and buyer . . . . But we see no reason or principle upon
which a warranty might run with an article for consumption like a war-
ranty of title running with land. We think the real ground of liability
of the seller to an ultimate consumer is, more properly speaking, a duty
one owes to the public not to put out articles to be sold upon the market
for use injurious in their nature, of which the general public have not
the means of inspection to protect themselves."' 8 In regard to what theory
this plaintiff proceeded on the court had this to say: "But, since all the
facts involved in the entire transaction were set forth in both pleading and
instruction, the sole theory of plaintiff's right to recover is not to be
limited to the technical requirements of the one word "warranty" and
that there must be an expressed actual contract between the stricken cus-
tomer and the blameworthy manufacturer before the former can recover
anything against the latter, does not necessarily follow. Here is a case
where, if any one should be held liable, it is clearly the manufacturer."'19 This
17. Madouras v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 12.
18. Id. at 448.
19. Id. at 449.
[Vol. 32
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constitutes one of 'the earliest 'reported indications that the implied war-
ranty technique was not even needed' but rather'that it was tort strict
liability being applied. It is fascinating to read the dissenting opinion of
Judge Bland and to appreciate the accuracy of his analyses: ". . [These
cases] have brushed aside the whole logic of a warranty which can only
be based upon contract . . . because they have been swayed by the dread-
fulness and shock of the thought of one taking into his system poisoned
or deleterious food or drink and have grasped at some means to hold
the manufacturer, as an insurer .... [A machine] would be as dangerous
to human-kind as deleterious drugs or foods. Similarly, the doctrine might
be extended to almost any article manufactured and sold, if the theory
of the majority opinion herein is the correct one." 20 The St. Louis Court
of Appeals was soon citing Madouras, but relying upon use of "implied
warranty" in cases of foreign ingredients in milk and in wrapped and
sealed packages of bread.21
In 1952 the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided the leading case of
Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. 22 The product was a washing powder
placed on the market for use in washing dishes where it was expected to
come into contact with human hands. The court stated that there would be
strict liability if the product contained ingredients making it unsafe for
normal persons using it in a normal manner. Although the plaintiff lost
for failure'of proof the opinion: is significant for two reasons: it recognized
a strict liability for a product other than food, and it thoroughly analyzed
the bases for this liability. The court traced the warranty concept from
its tort origins through its contract connections and stated,
There is no good reason why the courts cannot re-examine
the nature of a warranty and determine whether in all cases a
relationship of sale or contract is a prerequisite to its existence
and, in the interest of social justice, reshape the law to conform
to the requirements of modem economic life.
The necessities of logic do not require that we disregard legal
history, which refutes the oft repeated statement that a warranty
is necessarily a contractual obligation, and follow decisions which
have imposed arbitrary limitations resting upon convenience, or
considerations of policy not applicable at the present time.
20. Id. at 450.
21. Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942);
Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940);
McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938).
22. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., supra note 14.
19671
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Under modern conditions of retail merchandising, and the
employment of widespread advertising, representations are, in
fact, made to the consuming public2 3
After a lengthy quotation from Williston Sales to the effect that
warranties were originally enforced in an action sounding in tort, the
court said that it should look beyond procedural forms to see the "real
nature of the wrong" and stated:
In the case of food products sold in original packages, and
other articles dangerous to life, if defective, the manufacturer,
who alone is in a position to inspect and control their preparation,
should be held as a warrantor, whether he purveys his product
by his own hand, or through a network of independent distributing
agencies. In either case, the essence of the situation is the same-
the placing of goods in the channels of trade, representations di-
rected to the ultimate consumer, and damaging reliance by the
latter on those representations. Such representations, being in-
ducements to the buyers making the purchase, should be regarded
as warranties, imposed by law, independent of the vendor's con-
tractual intentions. The liability thus imposed springs from repre-
sentations directed to the ultimate consumer, and not from the
breach of any contractual undertaking on the part of the vendor.
This is in accord with the original theory of the action.24
The box of washing powder contained the legend "Tide is kind to
your hands." Therefore, the case technically involves an express represen-
tation. This may account for the heavy emphasis on warranty theory.
However, the authorities relied upon and the language of the opinion
easily encompass the notion that strict liability is justified because plac-
ing the product on the market constituted a representation that it was
fit for use.25
23. Id. at 536.
24. Id. at 537. (Emphasis added)
25. It should be mentioned here that it has long been recognized that a tort
action may be maintained for physical harm as a result of reliance upon an express
representation of fact made through advertising even though there was no privity
of contract between the plaintiff and defendant. Baxter v. The Ford Motor Com-
pany, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). The rule is restated in RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 402B (1965). Since this is strict liability, unlike deceit there would be no
necessity to prove intent or scienter. Cf. Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo.
1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945), Venie v. South Central Enterprises, Inc., 401 S.W.2d
495 (Spr. Mo. A pp. 1966). Most of the underlying theories and the practical prob-
lems of strict liability for injuries caused by products are about the same whether
the defendant has expressly or impliedly guaranteed his product. Therefore, in this
article discussions of express warranty are woven into the text wherever pertinent
to the problem under consideration.
[Vol. 32
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In Midwest Game Company v. MY.A. Milling Co.26 the Missouri
Supreme Court, without discussion, not only approved as an established
rule the strict liability for packaged food for human consumption with-
out privity, but also extended the "implied warranty" to processed and
packaged animal foods. The case is interesting because it was necessary to
use evidence of trade usage to establish that the food was marketed as
a "complete" fish food. Once that fact was established, the "implied war-
ranty" in the absence of privity resulted in strict tort liability for failure
to be a complete food for fish. Although the holding is limited to packaged
food, the primary significance of the decision is that it imposes strict
liability for damage to property (plaintiff's fish) as distinguished from per-
sonal injuries. Only one short step was needed to plunge Missouri into
the forefront of modern products liability law.
In Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,27 where a defective valve in
a gas cooking stove had caused a fire which destroyed the plaintiff's house-
hold furnishings, the step was taken. The supreme court held the manu-
facturer of the stove strictly liable for the damage. The court, paraphras-
ing the leading Henningse,08 decision, said, ". . . there can be no rational
doctrinal basis for differentiating between the fly in the beverage bottle,
the defective automobile, the defectively processed food for animals, and
an imminently dangerous defective gas cooking range .. .'29 The decision
is historic because the court extended strict liability to harm from manu-
factured articles and facilities. Thus was fulfilled Judge Bland's dire
prophecy: the doctrine of strict liability without privity was extended
to harm from any defective manufactured article.
It is of primary importance that the court traced the tort back-
ground of warranty and twice acknowledged the exact type of liability
being imposed: "The precise question now presented to this court . . .
is whether privity of contract is necessary in order for an ultimate con-
sumer to recover from a manufacturer on an implied warranty or, per-
haps stated more frankly, whether a manufacturer . .. is to be held to
strict liability upon proof of the defect and of causation,"30 and ".... courts
of many of the states have considered and, with varying degrees of forth-
rightness, applied the rule of implied warranty without privity of contract
26. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
27. 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); McCleary, Torts in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv.
71 (1965).
28. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
29. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 27, at 54.
30. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
19671
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(in effect, .trict liability) to the manufacturers ...,"3 Further, in stating
its holding the court did not say the defendant was to be held liable for
breach of warranty, but was "to be held liable as an implied warrantor
of the fitness and reasonable safety of the gas cooking range ...,,32 These
are the statements that classify Morrow as among the more radical and
far-reaching of the country's decisions. The court was revealing that the
implied warranty technique which it used was not necessary to its holding.
The court that first held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort without
resort to the warranty theory was the California Supreme Court in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 3 which was prominently quoted in
the Morrow opinion. Greenman is, "... a landmark decision which is
certainly the most important decision since ffenningsen. and perhaps the
most important since MacPherson v. Buick."3 4 This decision and the
VandermarkM5 decision, which followed soon after, formed the basis for
the new Restatement of Torts section, 402 A, that sets out strict liability
in tort without the use of any warranty terminology.36 With good reason,
in 1966 the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri held that the Morrow case obviously adopted the rationale of
the rule restated in section 402 A and predicted that that section would
be expressly adopted as the law of Missouri.3 t In January, 1967 a motion
to transfer to the Supreme Court was denied in Williams v. Ford Motor
Company,38 the Missouri decision that can be fairly interpreted as an
express adoption of Restatement section 402 A. The opinion sets out the
section in full after saying, "The defendant's liability for a defective prod-
31. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 55.
33. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
34. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY, 173 (1966).
35. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) It is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition
in which it is sold.
(2 The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
37. Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
38. 411 S.W.2d 443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
[Vol. 32
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uct can no longer be measured by the principles of negligence and privity,
nor by the intricate law of sales.13 9
To adopt the Restatement position is to be in the forefront of surg-
ing legal change.40 The main advantage to Missouri courts in fully adopt-
ing the Restatement theory could be release from the shackles of war-
ranty language. Whether the words "strict liability" or "implied warranty"
or both combined are used, the difference in Missouri would not be one
of substance since our courts are clearly recognizing the tort nature of
the liability imposed. However, using the language of the Restatement
would avoid innumerable vexing problems that have arisen in other
jurisdictions where the device of warranty is used to impose strict li-
ability. It is unfortunate that the Williams opinion unnecessarily and
inaccurately uses the phrase "implied warranty" in addition to the ex-
pression "strict liability." The use of that phrase is in no way essential
to its holding. So long as we use the superfluous implied warranty words
we must continually remind ourselves, as Dean McCleary indicated,
that it is different from the warranty usually found in the sales of
goods cases.4 1 Better yet, since section 402 A is our position then let
us use that language. Let us develop tort liability and defenses as much
as possible without the use of the warranty concept which is so tainted
with contractual overtones.
Clear analysis and careful selection of terminology by attorneys could
avoid confusion at the trial level which leads to needless errors and appeals.
Very little law has developed on what should be pleaded. Alternative meth-
ods of pleading a tort action have been suggested as follows: 42
Strict Liability in Tort Strict Liability in Warranty
1. Defendant placed upon the mar- 1. Facts upon which warranty is
ket a product in a defective con- based; manufacture, distribu-
dition which was unsafe for its tion, sale, bailment, or other
intended use. transactions which give rise to
the warranty.
39. Id. at 448.
40. See bitter opposition from the Defense Research Institute in Monograph,
supra note 2. The Brief in turn received its licks. Langermann, Defense Institute's
"Brief" Assailed For Intellectual Dishonesty, Trial p. 43, Dec.-Jan. 1966-1967.
41. McCleary, Torts in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 71, 73 (1965).
42. Emroch, Testimony and Proof in a Products Liability Case, PROCEEDINGS,
SEC'rION OF INSURANcE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, A.B.A. 1966; See also,
3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRoDucTs LABILITY, 46.02 (3).
1967]
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2. Defendant placed the product
upon the market knowing that
it would be used without in-
spection for defects.43
3. Plaintiff was using the product
in a manner which was reason-
ably foreseeable. 44
4. The defect in the product was
a proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries.
5. Medical causation, injuries, and
damage.
2. Identifying type of warranty as
express or implied.
3. Reliance where action is brought
upon an express warranty for
particular purpose.
4. Facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the breach of the war-
ranties, such as defect in prod-
uct, or, not fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such product
was used.
5. Plaintiff's injury proximately
caused by defendant's breach of
the warranty.
6. Notice to defendant of the
breach of warranty (where re-
quired).
7. Injuries and damages.
The Strict Liability in Tort column could be the model for pleading any
action in Missouri that falls within section 402 A of the Restatemenmt.
Hopefully, we will soon have an approved instruction along the lines of
that submitted in Wiiams v. Ford Motor Company. A new trial was
ordered for failure to include a requirement that the defect existed at
the time it left the defendant's control; however, the instructions form
a basic pattern, which could be used for stating strict tort liability without
reference to warranty. In the opinion of this author it is neither necessary
nor wise to couch Missouri pleadings or instructions in the old-fashioned
warranty form illustrated in the second column.
In working out the practical problems of pleading and proving a
strict liability case it may help to review the policy considerations behind
the theory. The Morrow opinion does not specify in particular what policy
reasons impelled the decision. It relies upon an excellent law review
43. The wording would be more accurate if it alleged that the product was
to be used "without further processing or substantial change." Decisions have not
yet begun to clarify the extent to which the manufacturer's responsibility will be
shifted by further processing, but mere inspection by a subsequent person such as
a retail car dealer will not relieve the manufacturer.
44. In Missouri it may be more accurate to allege that the plaintiff was using
the product "in the manner and for the purpose for which it was manufactured"
or "in an ordinary and normal manner."
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comment,45 the Worley46 decision, and the well known HenningseAT and
GreewmaO84s decisions among others and in so doing refers to all the policy
reasons that have been stated at various times as vindication for strict
liability. There is a major policy justification included in some of the
more recent cases to which the court referred that had not been previously
articulated in the Missouri cases and which could be influential in the
development of future products liability law. The court in Morrow sets
out the following statement from Henningsen: "'In that way the burden
of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who
are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable distri-
bution of the losses when they do occur. "49 This is the risk-spreading
theory first expressed by Justice Traynor in 1944 when he stated in a
concurring opinion, "the risk of injury can be insured against by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness." 50 In the Greemnan case, which the Morrow court cites, Traynor
said, "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves." 51 Rather than a somewhat narrow justi-
fication based on chances of increasing safety or based upon "fault" for
having made a representation, this is the essence of traditional tort strict
liability theory as enunciated in cases dealing with dangerous animals or
abnormally dangerous activities. It is the fundamental notion that as be-
tween two innocent persons the one whose activities caused an injury is
the one who ought to bear the cost of it. "Fault" lies in causation of an
unusual risk. In these days of The Great Society it is the courts' conviction
that the cost of individual injuries can be spread without apparent detri-
ment to the economy or to society which permits them to implement this
theory in such a vast area as products liability.
45. Roberts, suzpra note 14.
46. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., supra note 14.
47. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 28.
48. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 33.
49. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 27 at 54 (emphasis
added).
50. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944).
51. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 33, at 901.
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